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Abstract   The purpose of this study is to determine if management measures
based on effort reductions, in particular days-at-sea (DAS) controls, can ap-
proach a harbor porpoise individual transferable quotas (ITQ) program in
terms of efficiency. The intent is to expand discussions of combining fishery-por-
poise management actions. The New England sink gillnet fishery is examined by
using a numerical bio-economic model. Year-round and seasonal surcharges in
combinations with overall DAS reductions are investigated. Results indicate that
several programs for marine mammal protection can achieve the same conser-
vation outcome with modest differences in industry profits. At the industry level,
the program selection decision may then rest on the goal of cod management,
since reductions in cod landings are much greater under the DAS year-round
(59–63%) versus seasonal (39–46%) programs. Significant differences in vessel
profits, however, may make consensus on the appropriate program difficult.
Key words   Fisheries management, individual transferable quotas, protected
species, marine mammals, turtles, bycatch.
JEL Classification Codes   Q220, Q280, Q570, Q580.
Introduction
Commercial fisheries incidentally capture and kill marine mammals and sea turtles
around the world. Given the potentially competing objectives of fisheries and pro-
tected species management, there remains a need to develop and analyze a range of
management tools that address these objectives in an integrated manner. In fisheries
economics it has been shown that output management with individual rights, in par-
ticular individual transferable quotas (ITQs), are superior compared to other
management measures in terms of profitability and sustainability of fisheries (e.g.,
Boyce 1992; OECD 1997; Morey 1986; National Research Council 1999; Geen and
Nayer 1988). However, there are few studies that empirically evaluate management
measures for protected species and fish simultaneously (Bisack and Sutinen 2006;
Pradhan and Leung 2006; Curtis and Hicks 2000; Hoagland and Jin 1997). This pa-
per systematically evaluates the use of input and output controls to simultaneously
manage fish and protected species.
In the United States of America (USA), the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) is subject to several laws designed to sustain fisheries and protected species
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stocks. The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA 1972) and the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA 1973) require the protection of marine mammals and sea turtles from
commercial fishing with limited economic guidance. The Magnuson-Stevens Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA 1976) and the Sustainable
Fisheries Act (SFA 1996) require a national program to insure conservation of fish
stocks and to realize the full potential of the nation’s fishery resources. An amend-
ment to the SFA defined a fishing community and included a mandate (National
Standard 8) to “take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing
communities.” In addition, NMFS must address the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA 1969), Executive Order 12866 (1993)1 and the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (RFA 1980), which requires the analysis of economic impacts of proposed regu-
latory actions from national to vessel-level impacts as well as for distributional
impacts. Consequently, the NMFS is responsible for regulating different resources
(fish and protected species) used or accessed by the same communities under differ-
ent acts with different goals and guidelines. There clearly is a need for integrated
analysis and management.
To achieve the objectives, NMFS has implemented a number of input and output
controls in fisheries. The principle means used to protect marine mammals under the
MMPA have been input restrictions in the form of gear modifications and closures.2
Under the MSFCMA and SFA, both input and output tools have been used. Input re-
strictions to reduce effort have included limiting DAS, requiring days out of the
fishery, and closures. Output restrictions have included trip limits and landings quo-
tas. The relationship between fisheries management actions and reduced protected
species bycatch has been acknowledged and accounted for in protected species man-
agement; however, full integration remains elusive.
The purpose of this study is to determine if management measures to reduce
protected species bycatch based on effort reduction, in particular DAS, can approach
a harbor porpoise ITQ policy in terms of efficiency while concurrently achieving
fisheries goals. If an effort-based action is appropriately designed to account for
spatial and temporal aspects of the fishery and bycatch, the industry-level economic
impacts should be similar; however, there may be distributional differences between
management measures. As a case study, I use the New England multispecies sink
gillnet fishery in 1994–95, which has a bycatch of harbor porpoise.3 At that time,
management for both the fishery and marine mammal bycatch were limited, and har-
bor porpoise bycatch was at a high level. The actions initiated in 1996 successfully
reduced bycatch by 90% in 1998; however, bycatch has increased since then and is
once again a concern in 2007. Management efforts to rebuild multi-species stocks
intensified after 1994, and there were regular changes in regulations. Yet, several
multispecies stocks currently remain overfished, so restrictive management actions,
including DAS limits, are likely to continue for some time. The model and results
illustrate that the multiple objectives of NMFS can be achieved simultaneously with
several alternative management programs.
1 See www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg
2 Gear modifications and closures have also been implemented under the ESA to reduce the lethal take
of sea turtles in the Chesapeake Bay pound net (NOAA 2006b), Atlantic sea scallop dredge (NOAA
2006c), and the summer flounder trawl fishery (67 Federal Register 18833, April 17, 2002).
3 The use of data from an earlier period allows for a systematic comparison of management measures
that have the potential to deal jointly with objectives for fish stock rebuilding and porpoise bycatch
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Background
Gillnet Fishery
Sink gillnet vessels operate from Maine to North Carolina. This study focuses on the
vessels that fish in the Gulf of Maine north of 42º N. Vessels leave port in the early
hours of the morning, haul their catch, reset their gear, and return to port the same
day. A vessel typically hauls four to eight strings of gear per trip, where one string is
around 3,000 feet in length. The gear is set in the water to soak for 24 to 72 hours,
after which it is hauled and reset. Harbor porpoise (Phocoena phocoena) become en-
tangled in the gear and suffocate. Target species landed by this fleet include cod
(Gadus morhua), spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias), pollock (Pollachius virens),
monkfish (Lophius americanus), and flounder (Pleuronectiform). Species landings
vary by mix, season, and area. For example, in a season area where groundfish land-
ings, such as cod, are prevalent, dogfish landings are typically absent. The spatial
temporal bio-economic model presented captures the mix and variation of species
catch rates.
In 1995, the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet fleet consisted of 200 vessels landing
15,140 tons of fish and generated revenues of $16.1 million (Bisack and Sutinen
2006). The five major target species were cod, which accounted for 19% of landed
weight and 36% of revenues; spiny dogfish (60% weight, 20% revenues); pollock
(10% weight, 20% revenues); monkfish (6% weight, 12% revenues); and flounder
(5% weight, 12% revenues). The observer program placed at-sea technicians on
more than 50% of these vessels and observed 5.6% (864.5 tons) of total landings.
The observer program also records trip costs including fuel, oil, food, bait, and wa-
ter. Trip operating costs recorded by the observer program showed the average
operating cost to be $56.86 (CV=0.96) per trip.
Harbor Porpoise Management
Under the MMPA, if the level of incidental takes of marine mammals is above the
potential biological removal (PBR) rate, the bycatch must be reduced.4 Take reduc-
tion teams (TRTs) are formed and tasked with the development of management plans
that reduce the serious injury and mortality of stocks to levels below PBR. In the
northeastern USA, plans have been developed for harbor porpoise, northern right
whales, and coastal bottlenose dolphins (Resolve 1996; NMFS 2005; NOAA
2006a).5 Regulations have included gear modifications and closures.
The Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy (GOM/BOF) harbor porpoise stock in the USA
ranges from North Carolina to Maine. The best estimate of the population size based
on 1991, 1992, and 1995 abundance survey data was 54,300 animals, with an al-
lowed PBR of 483 (Waring, Quintal, and Swartz 2000).6 The average annual bycatch
4 Potential biological removal (PBR) is defined by Wade and Angliss (1997) as “the maximum number
of animals, not including natural mortalities, which may be removed from a marine mammal stock while
allowing that stock to reach or maintain its optimum sustainable population.” PBR is the product of
three elements: the minimum population estimate, half the maximum net productivity rate, and a recov-
ery factor.
5 Right whale deaths have been associated with pot gear (including lobster) and the sink gillnet, while
bottlenose dolphin and harbor porpoise takes have occurred primarily in sink gillnet fisheries.
6 In 1998, PBR for harbor porpoise was increased to 747 animals and decreased to 610 animals in 2007.
This is a result of new sightings survey data and therefore new population estimates (Waring et al. 2006,
2007). However, population and PBR estimates used in this study were based on the data that were
available in 1995, when the TRP was being developed and for the period applicable to the data used.Bisack 364
estimate for 1991-1995 was 1,833 animals (Waring, Quintal and Swartz 2000).7 The
Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team (HPTRT) convened in 1996, and the Take
Reduction Plan (TRP) was implemented in January 1999 (NMFS 1998).
Prior to implementation of the Plan, Amendment 5 of the Northeast
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP) implemented closed areas and re-
quired pingers to control harbor porpoise bycatch in the U.S. Northwest Atlantic.8
Pingers are acoustical devices attached to gillnets to deter porpoise. Starting in
1996, closures increased in size and duration to try to reduce porpoise bycatch to be-
low PBR. These expansions reflected the inter-annual variability in harbor porpoise
migration patterns, influenced by exogenous factors such as water temperature and
prey availability.
The TRP specifically recognized the reduction in harbor porpoise bycatch from
rolling closures implemented under Amendment 5 of the FMP. However, these roll-
ing closures were insufficient to reduce the porpoise takes to below PBR (NMFS
1998; 63 Federal Register 66464, December 2, 1998). Therefore, the HPTRT Plan
included additional closures and mandatory pinger use to further reduce harbor por-
poise bycatch.
By 1998 bycatch in the Northeast sink gillnet fleet was reduced by 90% to lev-
els below PBR (Waring, Quintal, and Swartz 2000). Until recently, the combination
of Plan requirements and effort reduction under the FMP kept harbor porpoise takes
below PBR. However, porpoise bycatch estimates started to increase in 2002 and
have exceeded PBR levels since 2004 (Waring et al. 2006). In December 2007, the
HPTRT reconvened to discuss potential modifications to current regulations.
Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan
The New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) implemented the FMP to
reduce the mortality on twelve FMP species, divided into 19 stocks. In 1994 a DAS
program was initiated which limits the number of days that a vessel can fish; each
permit holder received a specific number of DAS. In 1995, the NE sink gillnet fish-
ery landed 96% of the proposed 1996 Gulf of Maine (GOM) cod total allowable
catch (NMFS 1996). These landings would have been acceptable if no other gear
types were harvesting GOM cod; however, the gillnet fleet accounted for only 45%
of GOM cod landings (Mayo and Col 2006). In 1996, Amendment 7 of the FMP
implemented an accelerated DAS reduction program for the sink gillnet and trawl
fisheries to reduce fishing effort by 50% in 1997 from 1994 levels (NEFMC 1996).
Since 1994 there have been numerous management changes to the FMP, which
have affected the New England sink gillnet fleet. By 2004, in an effort to allow
stock rebuilding, the annual allocation of DAS dropped by 82%, while trip limits
were tightened (NEFMC 2006). Despite these actions, in 2006 several stocks, in-
cluding GOM cod, remained below their rebuilding targets.
To address the need for significant reductions in fishing effort on several stocks,
an emergency rule published on April 13, 2006 (NMFS 2006a) implemented differ-
7 During the same period, the Gulf of Maine harbor porpoise bycatch was 1,521 animals. The Gulf of
Maine, a geographic subset of the Northeast, is the focus of this study.
8 The New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) proposed a four-year program to reduce the
harbor porpoise bycatch off New England to 2% of the estimated harbor porpoise population size per
year. To achieve this goal, the NEFMC recommended phasing in time and area closures to sink gillnet
gear, such that take levels would be reduced by 20% each year over the four-year period. The first clo-
sure was implemented in November 1994 (50 CFR 651, May 25, 1994); in 1995 the closure was ex-
panded in area and time to include the month of December (50 CFR Part 651, October 30, 1995).Integrating Porpoise and Cod Management 365
ential DAS counting for all groundfish vessels not participating in the United States/
Canada Management Area on Georges Bank. A proposed rule published on July 26,
2006 (NMFS 2006b) created two differential DAS areas: GOM and Southern New
England (SNE). For each day that a vessel fishes for any part of a trip in the GOM
area, it is charged for two DAS. The purpose of differential DAS counting is to dis-
courage effort in areas where particular fish stocks are not recovering. As such, the
differential could be considered a DAS surcharge. A vessel may decide to fish
within the surcharge area for various reasons, including profit potential. The sur-
charge, by reducing profit potential, discourages but does not ban such activity. The
objective of the suite of groundfish regulations is to allow groundfish stocks to re-
cover and rebuild to target (maximum sustainable yield [MSY]) biomass levels. This
concept of differential DAS counting, referred to as DAS surcharges, is used in this
analysis. The analysis presented here draws on data from the years 1994 and 1995,
prior to implementation of differential DAS counting.
The Model
Bisack and Sutinen (2006) developed a numerical bio-economic model which al-
lowed the comparison of impacts between closures and a harbor porpoise ITQ
system. This model is modified to expand the comparison to alternative DAS reduc-
tion policies that include different degrees of spatial and temporal specificity. In this
analysis, four versions of fleet behavior were modeled: no regulations (baseline),
closures, ITQs, and DAS restrictions. The first three are more fully described in
Bisack and Sutinen (2006), but are summarized here.
The bio-economic model incorporated the spatial and temporal patterns of the
gillnet fleet’s fishing effort, harbor porpoise, and several fish species harvested by
the fleet. The temporal stratification was by season (s being winter, summer, or fall),
while the spatial stratification was by port group (p being Maine, New Hampshire,
northern Massachusetts or southern Massachusetts), from which a vessel operates.
Port was synonymous to fishing area;9 in this fleet, vessels in port-groups fish in
non-overlapping areas (figure 1). Vessels are treated as homogeneous within a sea-
son-port (Nsp), since they face the same price, production conditions, and costs in
each season-port combination.10
Let qisp represent a vessel’s trip production of fish species, i, in season, s, port,
p. A vessel’s production of fish species is modeled at the trip level, which is a func-
tion of exogenous season-port dockside prices of the fish species (Pisp), fish
abundance, and the number of strings hauled. The cost per fishing trip for a vessel
operating out of a season-port is a function of effort, csp(esp). The vessel’s total sea-
son-port operating cost of effort increases at an increasing rate with an increase in
number of trips per vessel, esp. Stock abundance, cost, and market conditions vary
across the season-port combinations available to each vessel.11
The total catch of an individual fish species for a season-port is the product of
9 The season-port stratification in this analysis is based on the temporal and spatial stratification used to
estimate total harbor porpoise bycatch (Bisack 1997). When a port is closed within this analysis, it as-
sumes a fishing area adjacent to the port is closed.
10 The data show trips are no longer than one day, but the number of trips vessels take per season varies.
Examination of vessel characteristic data also shows that vessels are physically alike, which supports
the homogeneous assumption within season and port. However, vessels are heterogeneous across season
and port strata.
11 For example, distance to fishing grounds varies across ports, which results in different trip costs due
to fuel and time consumption.Bisack 366
the number of vessels, trips per vessel, and the vessel’s production function. The in-
cidental take of harbor porpoise is calculated similarly. Since managers in the model
set a binding quota on the total bycatch of harbor porpoise, the population dynamics
relationship is not specified.
For simplicity, I assume there is no natural growth, natural mortality, or recruit-
ment in the exploitable fish populations during each of the fishing seasons and that
the fish stock abundance within a year declines by the total harvest by all fleets in
each season.12 In addition to gillnets, several gear types harvest each commercial
species; therefore, seasonal stock size (abundance) is equal to the last period’s stock
size minus the harvest by sink gillnet gear and the harvest of other gear determined
exogenously.
Each model predicts equilibrium values for fleet effort, profits, number of sea-
son-ports open, and catch rates—in total and as distributed across ports and seasons.
The theoretical models cannot by themselves predict or explain the quantitative dif-
ferences between the programs. For that, a numerical model based on these
theoretical constructs was developed. The functional relationships are estimated and
presented in Bisack and Sutinen (2006).
Figure 1. Observed Sink Gillnet Hauls by Port Group (1994 and 1995)
Note: Data show the limited overlap in fishing area between groups.
12 For information on commercial species see: Northeast Fisheries Science Center Reference Document
02-16-Assessment of 20 Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2001 – A Report of the Groundfish As-
sessment Review Meeting (GARM). Posted on the web October 25, 2002.Integrating Porpoise and Cod Management 367
Baseline
In the baseline model, no regulations are imposed on the fishery. Each vessel has a
certain number of season-port combinations available from within which they can
choose to operate during the course of a normal, unregulated fishing year.13 Each
vessel chooses both the profit-maximizing amount of effort to apply and the season-
port combination that maximizes it profits. The fleet maximizes profits by solving
the following objective function with respect to effort:
Maximize N e P q c e
e











⎭ ⎪ ∑ ∑ ∑ (1)
The total effort within a season-port is the product of the number of trips per vessel and
the number of vessels. The fleet size in each season-port is historically predetermined.
Closures
To account for the policy of time and area closures to control harbor porpoise
bycatch, assume that managers select a set of season-port closures to ensure (or at
least maximize the likelihood) that total catch is less than the binding quota. When
one or more of the season-port combinations is closed, the total number of season-
port combinations available to the fleet is reduced. Vessels formerly fishing in the
closed season-ports have to move to other ports (areas) or cease operations. The an-
nual revenue no longer covers all of the annual fixed cost for some of the vessels.
Having fewer season-ports in which to operate effectively lowers revenues and/or
raises the average total cost of annual effort for those vessels affected by the clo-
sure. Since losses are encountered, some vessels are induced to leave the fishery,
and total effort (and fishing mortality) is reduced. The reduction in effort results in a
reduction in landings in the short run. In summary, compared to the baseline a clo-
sure will lead to fewer vessels, less fishing effort, and lower landings of fish in the
short run.
Individual Transferable Quotas
To model the fishery under ITQ management, it is assumed managers impose a total
annual bycatch quota on harbor porpoise; allocate the total quota among the gillnet ves-
sels, such that each vessel has an individual quota; and allow vessels to freely trade their
quotas at any time during the year. The fleet as a whole behaves as if it is attempting
to maximize profits over the year, subject to a total harbor porpoise quota (Q):
Neq Q sp sp hsp
p s
≤ ∑ ∑ . (2)
Solving the first-order conditions for this problem with respect to effort shows
each vessel operates at an effort level that equates its average revenue of effort to its
13 Of course, each vessel can choose to operate in only one port (area) for each season of the year.Bisack 368
marginal cost of effort plus a harbor porpoise user cost. The user cost of harbor por-
poise is the product of two components: (i) the vessel’s season-port production rate
of harbor porpoise, and (ii) the shadow price for a unit of harbor porpoise quota
based on fishery values. The market for harbor porpoise quota is assumed perfectly
competitive. Therefore, the shadow price is equivalent to the ITQ price of harbor
porpoise. Further, the marginal value of one more unit of harbor porpoise quota is
equal across all seasons and ports, unless the effort or production rate of harbor por-
poise is equal to zero.
Days-at-sea
Managers can impose two types of DAS restrictions to reduce the total harvest of
commercial fish species and the bycatch of harbor porpoise: (i) a reduction in the
number of days a vessel can fish, and (ii) a variable surcharge. DAS surcharges are
assigned to certain fishing areas to address spatial and for some cases seasonal dif-
ferences in species abundance. One DAS is equivalent to one fishing trip and is
transferable between seasons within a port.
The joint outcomes of alternative DAS reduction scenarios that target either re-
ductions in groundfish landings or harbor porpoise bycatch are examined. Cod
(Gadus morhua), one of the five major species landed by gillnet gear in the Gulf of
Maine, is used as a proxy for all managed groundfish species. That is, although
other species are included in the model, this paper only reports cod landings.
Three different DAS measures are examined. In the first DAS program, every
vessel receives a reduction in their annual DAS and is called the “DAS Annual Re-
duction” (DAR) Program. The model examines the degree to which a DAS reduction
program designed to limit cod landings may affect harbor porpoise bycatch. The
second program, “Differential DAS” implements year-round (DDY) or seasonal
(DDS) surcharges to specific fishing areas. Exclusive year-round or seasonal DAS
surcharges are applied to specific ports to account for spatial differences in porpoise
bycatch. The third type of program combines the DAS annual reduction and the sur-
charge under the Differential DAS program and is referred to as the “Combined
DAS” Program. A Combined DAS year-round (CDY) and seasonal (CDS) program
is investigated.
In order to ensure that harvest and bycatch goals are met under the DAS model,
the following constraint was added to the baseline model:
Ne r E sp sp sp p
s
sp ττ ≤≥ ∑ 1, (3)
where τsp is the season port-group surcharge, r is the operating percentage of annual
DAS compared to the baseline, and Ep is the total optimal port effort (in DAS) un-
der the baseline model. The starting point of the DAS model is the same as the
baseline when no management restrictions exist.
Simulation of Programs
Three sources of data were available from the Northeast Fisheries Science Center
(NEFSC) Woods Hole, Massachusetts: (i) Northeast Fishery Observer Program
(NEFOP), (ii) the Northeast Commercial Fisheries Database System (NCFDS), and
(iii) the NEFSC Research Vessel Survey database. The NEFOP program records pro-Integrating Porpoise and Cod Management 369
tected species bycatch, fish catch, gear, and economic data by placing technicians
aboard vessels. The NCFDS data are used to estimate total effort (in trips), fish
landings, and to calculate dock-side prices of each species. The third data set was
used to calculate a minimum population biomass estimate for five Gulf of Maine
fish species since fish population estimates were not available for species studied
here. Details on the data used within this analysis are in Bisack and Sutinen (2006).
This analysis uses data from 1994–95, when management for both the fishery and
harbor porpoise bycatch were limited.
The models were run to produce the predicted outcomes and were then com-
pared. Bisack and Sutinen (2006) estimate a total harbor porpoise bycatch of 1,303
animals, under the baseline model.14 For demonstration purposes, porpoise takes of
507 animals are reported in this paper, similar to PBR in 1995 (i.e., 483), to allow
comparisons of DAS management to closure and ITQ management for controlling
porpoise bycatch.
Under the closure model, the season-port with the highest bycatch was closed
first by setting its fishing effort to zero.15 The model with this closure is run and es-
timates of catch and profits were produced. To reach a target of 507 porpoise, three
season-ports were shut down to fishing. Specifically, Maine was closed in the fall,
and New Hampshire was closed in the fall and winter. To estimate the consequences
of the ITQ policy, we set the total harbor porpoise quota (Q) in the ITQ model equal
to 507.
Under the “DAS Annual Reduction” (DAR) Program, all ports receive the same
annual DAS reduction (r < 1). The surcharge was one (i.e., τsp = 1) for all season-
ports, and r was re-adjusted until the porpoise goal of 507 is met. In the
“Differential DAS” model, year-round or seasonal DAS surcharges (τsp > 1) were
applied to specific ports to account for spatial differences. There was no reduction in
the annual DAS (r = 1). A surcharge value of two implied that a vessel fishing one
DAS would be charged for two DAS. The data show that Maine and New Hampshire
vessels were responsible for 83% of the total take of harbor porpoise bycatch; there-
fore, these northern ports received the additional surcharge (τsp > 1). Massachusetts
vessels did not receive an additional surcharge (τsp = 1). The seasonal surcharge was
relaxed in the summer when harbor porpoise bycatch was lowest compared to other
seasons. The model was run with initial surcharge values for Maine and New Hamp-
shire vessels, and the surcharge was then re-adjusted for subsequent runs until the
total porpoise bycatch was reduced to 507.
Under the “combined DAS” program, all vessels received a reduction in the an-
nual DAS compared to the baseline model, and some ports received a DAS
surcharge. The overall annual reduction (r) can be set to any level, and the port sur-
charge (τsp) can be readjusted until the porpoise take of 507 is met. While a range of
annual reduction levels was examined, for illustration purposes, the annual DAS
was reduced by 20% for all vessels (r = 0.80);16 with an additional surcharge applied
to Maine and New Hampshire. If the annual reduction was low, the results were
similar to the differential DAS program and a high annual reduction would have re-
sults similar to the DAR program.
14 Because of modeling differences, bycatch estimates presented here vary with those in Waring, Quin-
tal, and Swartz (2000).
15 Two scenarios were investigated in Bisack and Sutinen (2006) for vessel mobility when a port is
closed. One scenario assumed vessels cease fishing during the season for which the port is closed, and
the other scenario allows vessels to fish in adjacent ports if they are open. For purposes of simplicity,
only the first scenario is presented here.
16 A 20% DAS reduction (r = 80%) was chosen since it was similar to the reduction under groundfish
regulations at the time.Bisack 370
Results
Seven programs to reduce the take of harbor porpoise are compared: closures (CL);
ITQs; an annual DAS reduction program (DAR); differential DAS year-round or
seasonal (DDY or DDS) program; and combined DAS year-round or seasonal (CDY
or CDS) program. Impacts on porpoise, profits, and cod landings at the industry,
port, and vessel levels are presented by program.
Under the baseline model, where there were no management restrictions, indus-
try profits were $7.2M, harbor porpoise bycatch was 1,302 animals, and 2,507
metric tons of cod were landed by the sink gillnet fishery in the Gulf of Maine. In
1995, this fleet consisted of 200 vessels, which fished approximately 15,350 trips
under the baseline model. All management programs achieved the same conserva-
tion goal of 507 harbor porpoise (figure 2). Although industry profits were highest
under ITQs, the other programs did not perform drastically different compared to
the baseline (17–26% reduction). The exception was the DAR program, which re-
duced industry profits by 46% compared to the baseline.
While all the programs had the same impact on harbor porpoise, the programs
can be separated into three groups based on reductions in cod landings and profits.
Group one had reductions in cod landings between 29–36% (CL, ITQ, DDS, and
CDS), while the second group experienced reductions between 46–52% (DDY and
CDY) (figure 3). The DAR program was the outlier, group three, with cod landings
reduced by 60%. Group three had the greatest reduction in industry profits com-
pared to the other two groups. In general, the DAS programs with the year-round
surcharges (DDY and CDY), capture the seasonal patterns of harbor porpoise
bycatch with additional restrictions on cod landings. The program selection decision
may be based on the goals of the cod management plan. That is, if large reductions
in cod landings are necessary to achieve the biological goals of cod, then the DAS
year-round (DDY and CDY) or DAR programs are likely to be preferred.
Figure 2.  Total Take of Harbor Porpoise, Industry Profits ($1,000,000),
and DAS Surcharge for each Management ProgramIntegrating Porpoise and Cod Management 371
Although profit reductions are slightly higher under the combined DAS seasonal
(CDS) program, the CDS program has even lower fishing effort levels and a higher re-
duction in cod landings compared to ITQs. Fishing effort for group one (CL, ITQ, DDS,
and CDS) was reduced between 18–31%, while group two (DDY and CDY) reduced
fishing effort by 40% compared to the baseline. The DAR program, group three, reduced
effort by 67%. Effort and cod reductions are strongly correlated with profit reductions.
Surcharge values were adjusted to reduce the total take of harbor porpoise in the
gillnet fishery. Surcharge values ranged between 3.2 and 8.6 under the differential
(DDY and DDS) and combined (CDY and CDS) DAS programs (figure 2).17 A sur-
charge of 3.2 implied Maine and New Hampshire vessels were charged 3.2 DAS for
fishing 1 DAS, while Massachusetts vessels received no surcharge. Porpoise take
rates were significantly lower in northern and southern Massachusetts compared to
the other ports. In general, seasonal surcharges reduce the majority of the porpoise
take in seasons with high bycatch rates (DDS and CDS), while programs with year-
round surcharges (DDY and CDY) shift some of the porpoise reductions to seasons
with lower bycatch rates. For this reason, year-round surcharge values are lower
than seasonal surcharge values. Additionally, surcharge values are lower under the
combined (CDY and CDS) compared to the differential (DDY and DDS) DAS pro-
grams. Massachusetts vessels are forced to reduce their porpoise bycatch under the
combined DAS (CDY and CDS) programs.
Figure 3.  Reduction in Industry Profits versus Cod Landings under Alternative
Management Programs Compared to the Baseline Model
Note: CL=Closure, ITQ=Harbor Porpoise ITQs, DAR=DAS Annual Reduction, DDS and DDY=Differential
DAS Seasonal and Year-round, CDS and CDY=Combined DAS Seasonal and Year-round.
17 The DAS surcharge in this example is much higher than the DAS surcharge currently in place under
the multi-species FMP DAS program. For ease of implementation, two DAS surcharge levels are used
for groundfish. The actual surcharge tends to be low (i.e., 2 in GOM). Twelve groundfish species are
being managed under the same DAS surcharge. The species that requires the largest reduction is likely
to be the binding constraint, which then determines the surcharge (personal communication, John
Walden, NEFSC).Bisack 372
Maine and New Hampshire ports had larger reductions in porpoise, port profits, and
cod landings compared to Massachusetts ports under all policies, with the exception of
the DAS annual reduction (DAR) program (table 1). Compared to the year-round sur-
charge (DDY and CDY) programs, the seasonal (DDS and CDS) programs provide
economic relief to Maine and New Hampshire vessels by allowing them to increase fish-
ing effort in the summer season when porpoise bycatch rates are low, which results in an
increase in port profits. The ITQ and the combined programs (CDY and CDS) force
Massachusetts ports to bear some of the burden of reducing porpoise bycatch.
If one assumed profits were a proxy for a port’s preference for a program, both
Maine and New Hampshire would likely prefer the ITQ, DAS seasonal (DDS and
CDS), and the DAR programs since profit reductions are similar (39-46%) com-
pared to the baseline (figure 4). Neither Maine nor New Hampshire would choose
the year-round surcharge programs (CDY and DDY), since profit reductions were
much greater (59-63%). However, Maine would prefer the closure (CL), while New
Hampshire would certainly not prefer the closure (CL). If the preferences of Massa-
chusetts ports are also considered, the closure (CL) and the differential DAS
programs (DDY and DDS) would be chosen over the combined DAS (CDY and
CDS) and the DAS annual reduction (DAR) program (table 1).
In summary, by examining the impacts of the various programs based on indus-
try profits and porpoise take, one might eliminate the DAR program (figure 3). Yet,
by examining the impact on ports we see Massachusetts would not consider the
Figure 4.  Reduction in Port Profits in Maine versus New Hampshire under
Alternative Management Programs Compared to the Baseline Model
Note: CL=Closure, ITQ=Harbor Porpoise ITQs, DAR=DAS Annual Reduction, DDS and DDY=Differential
DAS Seasonal and Year-round, CDS and CDY=Combined DAS Seasonal and Year-round.Integrating Porpoise and Cod Management 373
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DAR program, but Maine and New Hampshire would (figure 4). New Hampshire
would not consider closures (CL), but Massachusetts and Maine would. However,
allowing each port to choose its own program is not typically allowed.18
Discussion
Industry, port, and vessel profits were simulated under seven different management
programs for the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet fishery designed to reduce harbor por-
poise bycatch by 61%. All programs met the same harbor porpoise conservation
objective, although cod management outcomes differ. Industry profits were greatest
under ITQs; however, results under other programs were not greatly different, with
the exception of the DAR program. If cod reductions are considered, managers may
choose the differential and combined DAS year-round (DDY and CDY) programs
over closures, ITQs, and DAS seasonal (DDS and CDS) programs. Thus, several
regulatory programs for marine mammal protection may achieve the same conserva-
tion outcome with modest differences in profits, but large differences in cod
landings.
The results illustrated the inter-relationships between fisheries and marine mam-
mal management actions at the industry level. At the port level, distributional
impacts may influence policy preferences. For example, northern ports would prefer
the DAS seasonal (DDS and CDS) and annual reduction (DAR) programs over the
DAS year-round (DDY and CDY) programs. Massachusetts ports would certainly
not prefer the DAS annual reduction (DAR) program, which provides economic re-
lief to northern ports at their cost. Separate management policies for each port
would be administratively difficult and would not achieve the porpoise take reduc-
tion goals. However, these differences must be recognized because they may lead to
difficulties in reaching consensus on management actions.
The current differential DAS surcharges under the Northeast Multi-species Fish-
eries Management Plan are designed to reduce fish landings and are year-round;19
they address spatial differences in species abundance. Such fisheries management
actions could also reduce harbor porpoise bycatch. However, the year-round nature
of this effort reduction is likely to result in smaller profits than if a more targeted
seasonal approach were used. The use of seasonal surcharges on DAS provides a
signal to fishers on the differences in harbor porpoise bycatch across seasons. They
also allow fishers to adapt to inter-annual differences in cod availability and prices,
thus allowing for higher profits than under broader DAS reductions.
These results assumed that DAS are non-transferable between ports; however,
existing regulations allow leasing of DAS between vessels.20 Transferability within
ports or between seasons may change these results, depending on the transfer/leas-
ing. For example, a within-port DAS transfer from winter to summer would reduce
porpoise bycatch. The greatest concern, from a protected species perspective, is for
the cases where porpoise bycatch could increase. This could occur if DAS were
transferred between ports or seasons when the receiving port/season has a higher
bycatch rate than the originating port/season.
18 Because vessels are of a homogeneous nature within a season port, vessel program preferences are
similar to the patterns identified at the port level (table 1).
19 DAS programs are targeting yellowtail flounder mortality reductions. In addition to DAS reductions,
vessel buyout programs and trip limits have been implemented (NEFMC 2006).
20 Under groundfish management, a leasing option was established under Amendment 13. There are four
classes of sink gillnet vessels based on engine horsepower and vessel length. Leasing is downward com-
patible. A vessel can only lease DAS from vessels within its own class or larger.Integrating Porpoise and Cod Management 375
The challenges that emanate from these results are twofold. First, separate regu-
lations are being developed for different resources accessed by the same
communities. As the results show, MMPA guidelines would not differentiate be-
tween the seven programs; however, an economist following E.O. 12866 guidelines
based on industry profits would recommend the closure, ITQ, and DAS seasonal
programs over the other programs. But if the MSFCMA, RFA, and NS 8 are consid-
ered independently or collectively, program preferences would differ. Incorporating
the goals of these Acts simultaneously into our empirical models to assist in manag-
ing our natural resources is a complex task. The challenge is to develop regulations
that are designed to achieve fish and protected species goals simultaneously. Addi-
tional empirical research could lead us away from single to multi-species and
eventually to ecosystems-based management. This paper suggests that although this
may be difficult, it is achievable.
Second, PBR could be allocated across the fishery based on biological and eco-
nomic principles as demonstrated in this article. Seven programs achieved PBR with
small differences in profits at the industry level, but examination of the disaggre-
gated results reveals striking differences between ports. How should a program be
selected? While various Acts provide some guidance on how to allocate impacts at
the industry, port, community, and vessel levels, the guidance is incomplete.
Under the appropriate set of policy instruments and management incentives, in-
dustry, scientists, and administrators can be compelled to search for and discover the
combination of tools and instruments that best meets economic, social, and biologi-
cal goals. Incentives can induce fishers to employ bycatch reduction devices, to
make conservation investments, or to undertake practices that may reduce the ad-
verse impacts of fishing (Grafton et al. 2006). For example, there are individual
non-transferable bycatch quotas used for dolphins in the international tuna-fishery
in the eastern tropical Pacific (Anonymous 2000; Hall 1998). Dolphin bycatch quo-
tas are assigned to individual vessels, but trade between vessels is prohibited. Tuna
boat operators have the incentive to create new fishing practices that avoid dolphins.
Such a profitable fishery can also offset the cost of an observer for the required
100% observer coverage. Although the property rights are not complete, rights can
be reassigned or forfeited. Harvesters may receive a price premium from certifica-
tion programs which endorse fishing practices that also support conservation goals.
Determining the set of input and output controls and technical measures that
may be “optimal” to meet agency objectives for a particular fishery is a fundamental
challenge. In the Northeast, groundfish regulations implement all three approaches:
DAS (input), trip limits (output), and mesh restrictions (technical measure). When
considering porpoise bycatch in the Northeast, a harbor porpoise ITQ program may
be economically more efficient than closures; however, there are practical issues of
implementation, in particular, enforcement. For a non-marketed species, such as har-
bor porpoise that is not landed at the dock, at-sea monitoring and/or enforcement is
necessary.21 Yet, porpoise takes are rare events for this particular gear type, and the
chance of detecting a porpoise ITQ violation at sea is extremely low, making ITQ
monitoring difficult.
In 2004, harbor porpoise bycatch increased to levels above PBR and was again a
concern in 2007 (Waring et al. 2006). To reduce the porpoise take below PBR
(again), it seems clear that new approaches are necessary. The New England Fisher-
ies Management Council is considering fisheries management alternatives for
21 The NEFOP samples approximately 5% of the sink gillnet’s total effort and is not likely to increase
sampling in the near future. In addition, unlike the ETP tuna fishery, sink gillnet profits would not be
large enough to offset the cost of an observer program.Bisack 376
groundfish through the Amendment 16 scoping process.22 As the various systems to
control groundfish are considered and evaluated, it would be prudent to incorporate
marine mammal and sea turtle bycatch goals into the system. DAS programs have
been implemented within the Northeast fisheries to achieve fisheries management
objectives.23 Extending the current DAS program to include a seasonal component
may be a stepping stone to additional approaches that protect marine mammals and
address social impacts while achieving fisheries management goals.
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